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Abstract: 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is widely hailed as a success story. Indeed, the life 
of the CJEU, as well as its contemporary position, hardly offer support for the thesis that a debacle has 
occurred in the traditional sense of the term. The current paper however opts for a broader 
understanding of that notion, indicating a collection of shortcomings that have gradually accumulated 
and persist up to the present day. The paper moreover suggests that the flaws are largely covert 
instead of overt, something that may well explain the lack of focused inquiries so far. To underpin 
these contentions, the analysis proceeds from a contemporary vantage point, consciously 
incorporating a historical dimension. Hereby, attention is devoted to four aspects that are believed to 
qualify as defects: the intermittent tug-of-war between the supranational and national judiciaries since 
the early 1960s; the sustained imperfections of the judicial selection and appointment process; the 
constantly variable quality of the case law; the internal pressures and agitations popping up since the 
creation of the Court of First Instance in the late 1980s. The findings demonstrate how every success 
story has its darker sides, with the CJEU constituting no exception to that rule. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union is widely hailed as a success story.1 Even though 
disagreement with regard to the legitimacy of its output seems steadily on the rise, its effective 
establishment as a supranational judiciary over the past six decades continues to attract general 
admiration.2 Compared to similar experiments in other parts of the world, the mere survival, let alone 
the progressive thriving of the EU’s judiciary constitutes a remarkable feat itself.3 In turn, to paraphrase 
one of its former Presidents, one wonders what would have become of the Community or Union 
without the existence of the Court?4 To the mind of many a lawyer musing on that question, little else 
is imaginable than a swift collapse, pursuant to acrimonious, insoluble conflicts, or at most a fledgling 
system – not the entrenched comprehensive architecture that we may still appreciate today. 
Writing about the failures of the CJEU might hence very well amount to a decidedly unenviable task, 
somehow evoking the scene of Diogenes meeting the great Alexander – admitting that the king 
deserved genuine reverence for his deeds, but caustically requesting that he now please step out of 
the sun. And yet, with European law aspiring to be a science rather than a religion, there ought to be 
no fears for accusations of blasphemy.5 Besides, the recent ‘historical turn’ in the study of the EU legal 
order has revealed various concerted practices and outright opportunistic moves to achieve particular 
goals, whereby the personal was remorselessly mixed with the political.6 In these narrations, for 
instance, the dealings of the aforementioned Court President, Mr. Robert Lecourt – a celebrated 
                                                        
* Professor of International and European Law, Radboud University Nijmegen; Visiting Professor of EU External Relations Law, 
University of Antwerp; Senior Fellow, Centre for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn. Thanks are due to Mr. Thomas 
Arnold for his invaluable research assistance. 
1 For the sake of convenience, the designations ‘CJEU’ and ‘Court’ are used interchangeably in this contribution to denote the 
institution as a whole during the entire 1952-2018 period. Where necessary, its branches or limbs will be explicitly distinguished 
as ‘ECJ’ (for ‘European Court of Justice’) and ‘CFI’ (for ‘Court of First Instance’), or ‘CJ’ (for ‘Court of Justice’) and GC (for ‘General 
Court’). 
2 With regard to the first statement, indeed “There is hardly any other issue relating to [its] operation that would give rise to 
such heat and passion: the legitimacy of what the ECJ has been doing and how it has been doing it”, (M. Bobek, ‘The Court of 
Justice of the European Union’, in A. Arnull & D. Chalmers (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of European Union Law (2015), 172. See 
inter alia M. Adams, H. de Waele, J. Meeusen & G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges – The Legitimacy of the Case Law of 
the European Court of Justice (2013); ‘Editorial Comments, The Court of Justice in the Limelight – Again’ 45 Common Market Law 
Review (2008), 1571. 
3 See e.g. K. J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law. Courts, Politics, Rights (2014). 
4 Cf. R. Lecourt, ‘Quel eût été le droit des Communautés sans les arrêts de 1963 et 1964?’, in A. Barav et al. (eds.), L'Europe et le 
droit. Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis (1991), 349. 
5 Yet, compare the virtual ostracising of the Danish scholar Hjalte Rasmussen after publication of his On Law and Policy in the 
European Court of Justice (Martinus Nijhoff 1986), as asserted in J.H.H. Weiler, ‘Hjalte Rasmussen – Nemo Propheta in Patria Sua’, 
in H. Koch, K. Hagel-Sørensen, U. Haltern & J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), Europe: The New Legal Realism. Essays in Honour of Hjalte Rasmussen 
(2010), xiii. 
6 See e.g. B. Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice – West Germany's Confrontation with European Law, 1949-1979 
(Cambridge University Press 2012); M. Rasmussen, ‘Revolutionizing European Law: A History of the Van Gend en Loos Judgment’ 
12 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2014) 136; A. Cohen, ‘“Ten Majestic Figures in Long Amaranth Robes”: The 
Formation of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’ in A. Vauchez & B. de Witte (eds.), Lawyering Europe (2013), 21. 
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French cabinet minister in his earlier life – take pride of place.7 Consequently, to a fair extent, the 
gloves are off already – and from an academic perspective, it would be rather more disingenuous to 
shy away from addressing elements that could enhance our understanding of where we are, which 
roads were (rightly or wrongly) taken, and on which path the European project may most advisedly 
proceed. 
To be sure then, every success story has its dark sides, and that of the CJEU is unlikely to be an 
exception. The current paper intends to demonstrate the veracity of that claim, which ultimately does 
remain a modest one. Spectacular failures are to be observed elsewhere. The life of the Court 
definitely does not offer support for the position that a ‘debacle’ has occurred in the traditional sense 
of the term. For our purposes, it suffices to stick to a broader understanding, indicating a collection of 
shortcomings that have gradually accumulated, and persist up to the present day. The ‘debacle’ 
shibboleth may optionally be employed in this context, but only to signify the failure to resolve every 
single one of them satisfactorily. 
The paper, in short, aims to highlight ‘all that is still wrong with the European Court of Justice’. As will 
be pointed out below though, these flaws are predominantly covert instead of overt, which arguably 
explains the lack of focused inquiries so far. That does not mean to say that there exists a dearth of 
scholarly criticism, yet the key arguments and analyses are largely scattered. Apart from the 
synthesising approach, the innovation offered by this contribution resides in the conscious 
incorporation of the historical, while principally departing from a contemporary vantage point. 
In what follows, consecutive attention is devoted to four aspects of the CJEU that are believed to qualify 
as defects: the intermittent tug-of-war between the Union and the national judiciaries since the early 
1960s (paragraph 2); the sustained imperfections of the judicial selection and appointment process 
(paragraph 3); the constantly variable quality of the case law (paragraph 4); the internal pressures and 
agitations popping up since the creation of the Court of First Instance in the late 1980s (paragraph 5). 
These threads are woven together in a brief concluding section (paragraph 6). 
 
 
II. Confined Authority: The Relentless Tussle between the European and the National Courts  
 
It probably does not go too far to assume that the relation between judicial institutions active on 
separate levels is always characterised by a natural tension. Moreover, this assumption could hold 
regardless of whether it concerns a relation between domestic courts, or between national and 
inter/supranational courts. A certain rivalry inevitably creeps into the minds of legal professionals that 
are expected to serve justice and ‘get it right’: in order to do their work at all, each and every judge 
must be convinced that he has reached the correct conclusion.8 The latter implies a low tolerance for 
outsiders second-guessing the choices made, for individual judges are habitually inclined to think they 
                                                        
7 See e.g. B. Davies and M. Rasmussen, ‘From International Law to a European Rechtsgemeinschaft: Towards a New History of 
European Law, 1950–1979’, in J. Laursen (ed.), Institutions and Dynamics of the European Community, 1973–83 (2014), 97. 
8 This conviction, rather than the (f)actual correctness, is arguably the best way to interpret the famous thesis articulated in R. 
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously (1978). 
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‘know better’ – an inclination that virtually forms part of their job description, and a main reason why 
people opt for an independent adjudicator anyway.9 
It hardly comes as a surprise then that the interrelation between on the one hand the courts of the 
Member States, especially national supreme courts, and on the other the European Court of Justice, 
exhibits exactly such a tension. This can obviously not be attributed to the CJEU if it indeed constitutes 
a natural phenomenon. To the extent however that it is the result of specific actions that excited 
friction, the question arises whether it could (and should) not have been avoided. Furthermore, 
whereas it might have been an incidental rather than a structural issue, we are faced with the contrary, 
since the interrelation has been strained for several decades now. Is one side perhaps more to blame 
for souring the waters?  
The German Bundesverfassungsgericht is widely regarded the most outspoken interlocutor, and the 
most unyielding of the CJEU’s critics. Many consider the saga to begin in 1974 with the notorious 
Solange I judgment, dismissing the claims of an autonomous legal order that supersedes the national 
one, including domestic norms of a constitutional nature.10 Despite the reversal in 1986 (Solange II), 
the later Maastricht Urteil and Lissabon Urteil, as well as a flurry of recent pronouncements, signalled a 
shift to the defiantly hostile mode.11 As known, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not stand alone, but 
was readily joined by inter alia its Italian and French counterparts. An unqualified acceptance of the 
supremacy of European law proved equally unpalatable for their colleagues in newly acceding 
countries, including Denmark, Ireland and Poland. Of late, the Czech Constitutional Court and the 
Danish Supreme Court even tiptoed on the edge of open war.12 Overall, few are ready to recognise 
the absolute competence of the CJEU, preferring to contend that the ultimate authority of EU law flows 
from the basic domestic norms, in particular the enabling clauses contained in the national 
constitution.13 
A first failing of the European Court of Justice is thus, that it did not entirely succeed in getting its 
message across; and that instead, it sowed the seeds for a protracted series of confrontations, by 
launching an unprovoked attack on the sovereign jurisdiction of Member States. So, the root of the 
problem here does not date back to 1974, but to 1963. That year’s Van Gend & Loos judgment is all 
too often cast in a favourable light, but sparked a controversy that led to an erosion, rather than an 
                                                        
9 Cf. M. Shapiro, Courts. A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981). 
10 BVerfG 2 BvL 52/71, 29 May 1974 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft – ‘Solange I’). 
11 BVerfG 2 BvR 197/83, 22 October 1986 (Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft – ‘Solange II’); BVerfGE 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, 12 October 
1993 (Brunner – Maastricht Urteil); BVerfG 2 BvE 2/08, 30 June 2009 (Lissabon-Urteil); BVerfG 1 BvR 256/08, 2 March 2010 
(‘Vorratsdatenspeicherung’); BVerfG 2 BvR 2728/13, 14 January 2014 (‘OMT-Beschluss’); BVerfG 2 BvR 2735/14, 15 December 2015 
(‘Europäischen Haftbefehl’). For incisive analyses, see M. Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law After Honeywell: 
Contextualizing the Relationship between  the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’ 48 Common Market Law 
Review (2011) 9; J.H. Reestman & L. Besselink, ‘Sandwiched between Strasbourg and Karlsruhe: EU Fundamental Rights 
Protection’  12 European Constitutional Law Review (2016) 213. 
12 J. Komárek, ‘Czech Constitutional Court Playing with Matches: the Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court 
of Justice of the EU Ultra Vires’  8 European Constitutional Law Review (2012) 323; R. Holdgaard, D. Elkan, G. K. Schaldemose, ‘From 
cooperation to collision: The ECJ’s Ajos ruling and the Danish Supreme Court’s refusal to comply’, 55 Common Market Law Review 
(2018) 17. 
13 For a detailed survey, see P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU Law (2015) 278-308. 
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enhancement of the legitimacy of the alleged ‘new legal order’.14 While justified in la doctrine as a logical 
corollary, the emphasis on supremacy and autonomy in Costa/ENEL exacerbated the status quo.15 
Additionally, the Court did not do itself a service either with its ruling in the Dairy Products case, wherein 
it sealed off the Community system by rejecting any reliance on the countermeasures normally 
available under international law.16 In the long run, the foregoing increased the discomfort for Member 
States to such a level that some became attracted to the idea of completely abandoning the 
integration project. In the meantime, the Court was itself responsible for triggering various adverse 
reactions from the national plane, which eventually turned into an intermittent tug-of-war. There, 
arguably, lies the original sin: in essence, those adjudicating on the Kirchberg brought that dogged 
struggle upon themselves, when a less blunt approach could have been attempted. Matters were 
compounded by the Court’s condoning of the liberal interpretations that other EU institutions gave to 
their own competences – fomenting the doubts of national judges, with a further weakened authority 
as the predictable boomerang effect.17 The upshot over the course of sixty years, also in view of the 
multiplying pockets of opposition, resembles a case of self-inflicted repetitive strain injury. 
That the bold dicta of the Court met with stiff resistance is not strange, nor is it unusual: research on 
comparable actors suggests that they are most vulnerable to backlash in the early stages of their 
development, when their position has yet to be solidified, and potential supporters have yet to 
mobilise.18 Nevertheless, this does not mean that there is nothing to justify a moderate stance from 
the very beginning: a subtle dialogue could have been just as conducive to a positive result. Whether 
the inroads made by Van Gend, Costa and Dairy Products were truly necessary or not, the harmonious 
emancipation of EU law would have stood to gain from decisions that excited a less antagonistic 
response. 
Telling and somewhat quaint is moreover the fact that an extensive ‘marketing campaign’ had to be 
undertaken to inform and persuade the Court’s interlocutors.19 Apparently, the authors of said 
decisions were not too sure that the key tenets would be properly understood, or go down easily. In 
part, the ambiguity of Van Gend & Loos was deliberate, but it did entail that the revolutionary dimension 
was not appreciated right from the start.20 If however the declaration of a new legal order, with 
                                                        
14 Judgment of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie 
der belastingen, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, on which see J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The Individual as Subject and Object 
and the Dilemma of European Legitimacy’ (2014) 12 International Journal of Constitutional Law 94. 
15 Judgment of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., C-6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, on which see O. Spiermann, ‘The Other Side of 
the Story: An Unpopular Essay on the Making of the European Community Legal Order’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 763. 
16 Judgment of 13 November 1964, Commission of the European Economic Community v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Kingdom 
of Belgium, joined cases C- 90 & C-91/63, ECLI:EU:C:1964:80, on which see W. Phelan, ‘The Troika: The Interlocking Roles of 
Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL in the Creation of the European Legal Order’ 21 
European Law Journal (2015) 116. 
17 Conversely, the tenuous upholding of the rule of law at the EU level is said to have prompted similar tendencies at the national 
level. See ‘Editorial Comments, The Rule of Law in the Union, the Rule of Union Law and the Rule of Law by the Union: Three 
interrelated Problems’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 597. 
18 See e.g. K. J. Alter, J. T. Gathii & L. R. Helfer, ‘Backlash against International Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes 
and Consequences’ 27 European Journal of International Law (2016) 293. 
19 See A. Vauchez, ‘The Transnational Politics of Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity’ 16 European Law 
Journal (2010) 1. 
20 The outcome represented a compromise between the authors, supported by the narrowest possible majority on the bench: 
see Rasmussen, supra note 6, at 153. 
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attendant radical features, was ever expected to inspire awe and command obedience amongst its 
subjects, better care might immediately have gone into the drafting process. At least in this sense, the 
landmark judgments of the 1960s were not the success that they were later said to be. 
To prevent misunderstanding, the central argument here is not that alternatives to those judgments 
should have been devised. The historic failure of the CJEU resides plain and simple in its inability to 
get each and every member of the national audience on board. Simultaneously, whilst regional 
integration can occasionally get off the ground without judicial activism, to claim that the 1960s 
judgments were wholly superfluous is to enter the realm of speculation.21 All the same, a measured 
strategy might well have induced less friction, and diminished the risk that the Court’s authority 
remains as confined as it is today. As an intriguing side-effect, that route opens the door to a world 
where the theory of legal pluralism (contemplating a peaceful co-existence between multiple 
overlapping norm systems) never caught on – and in fact, never had to catch on either, in absence of 
the divide it seeks to bridge.22 
 
 
III. Questioning the Court’s Membership: Defects in the Selection and Appointment Process 
 
The quality of the performance of an organisation will always depend on the quality of the people 
running the show. Disturbingly, the Treaty of Paris that laid the groundwork for the CJEU did not 
demand that the judges appointed to the Court possess any legal qualifications, merely that they were 
chosen from among persons of recognised independence and competence.23 By consequence, the 
backgrounds and expertise of the Court’s founding members were quite heterogeneous, including 
such rare specimens as the Dutch trade unionist Petrus Serrarens (on the bench from 1952-1958) 
and the French governmental advisor Jacques Rueff (1952-1962). Party affiliations and political 
connections played a marked role in their recruitment, with a distinct air of nepotism surrounding the 
selection process.24 For almost sixty years, the system for appointing judges and advocates general 
was neither very complicated nor very demanding. Member States were trusted to come up with a 
suitable nomination whenever a vacancy arose. The system was based on mutual trust, cloaking a non-
aggression pact of sorts – no country daring to question another’s candidate, for fear of a future acts 
in retaliation.25 The nomination was forwarded to the Council, where as a rule it was approved.26 No 
                                                        
21 Interestingly, the EFTA Court managed to secure the effectiveness of EEA law without asserting its direct effect or autonomy: 
see H.-P. Graver, ‘The Effects of EFTA Court Jurisprudence on the Legal Orders of the EFTA States’ in C. Baudenbacher, P. Tresselt 
& T. Oerlyggson (eds.), The EFTA Court: Ten Years On (2005), 79. 
22 A divide it is unable to bridge in actual practice anyway, being a descriptive and not a normative theory. See e.g. K. Jaklic, 
Constitutional Pluralism in the EU (2014). 
23 See Article 32 of the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community (1951). 
24 See e.g. K. J. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power – Selected Essays (2009) 127; W. Feld, ‘The Judges of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities’ 9 Villanova Law Review (1963) 45; Cohen, supra note 6, 35-36. 
25 Cf J.-M. Sauvé, ‘Le rôle du comité 255 dans le sélection du juge de l’Union’ in A. Rosas, E. Levits & Y. Bot (eds.), The Court of 
Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-law – La Cour de Justice et la Construction de 
l’Europe: Analyses et Perspectives de Soixante Ans de Jurisprudence (2013), 101. 
26 Officially submitted to what is called the ‘Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States’; in 
reality, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) ensured prior approval. 
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serious inspection took place whether those selected had what it takes to do a good job. There is no 
record of anyone ever being rejected, so once proposed, appointment was guaranteed. Rumours 
abound with regard to those that turned out less felicitous picks, whereby the diligence of generations 
of référendaires has helped to disguise some (otherwise very embarrassing) judicial calamities.27 
The domination of the process by Member State governments reflects a historical constant. During 
the negotiations on the creation of the Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the French delegation 
strongly pushed for maintaining their sovereign prerogative, insisting on appointment by common 
accord, despite objections from the German representatives who argued that this approach would 
jeopardise judicial independence.28 The European Parliament has through the years met with a 
comparable lack of success with its repeated calls for greater involvement in the nomination 
procedure.29  
Meanwhile, a beefing-up of the criteria has occurred: as Article 253 TFEU currently demands, the 
nominees are to be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries, or 
who are jurisconsults of recognised competence.30 In line with Article 254 TFEU, members of the 
General Court need to be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who 
possess the ability required for appointment to high judicial office.31 In line with Articles 253 and 254 
TFEU, a new advisory panel was created in 2010 that must be consulted before the Member State 
governments can proceed to the appointment phase. The new scrutiny mechanism definitely allows 
for a more objective and independent assessment of whether the candidates truly meet the set 
criteria.  
Since a negative opinion of the panel can only be overturned with unanimity, it has in practice acquired 
a de facto veto.32 Still, this offers no silver bullet for the systemic maladies that plague the recruitment 
process. For starters, take the glaring democratic deficit, in that the Council members are left with little 
or no room to depart from the report submitted by the experts. The technocrats now rule supreme, 
holding the formerly all-powerful elected officials in thrall, while the Parliament was fobbed off with 
the right to install one panel member. To be sure, the argument here is not one for a wholesale 
                                                        
27 See e.g. M. Cohen, ‘Judges of Hostages? Sitting at the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of 
Human Rights’ in B. Davies & F. Nicola (eds.), EU Law Stories (2017), 58; F. G. Jacobs, ‘Advocates General and Judges in the 
European Court of Justice: Some Personal Reflections’ in D. O’Keeffe & A. Bavasso (eds.), Judicial Review in European Law: Liber 
Amicorum in Honour of Lord Slynn of Hadley (2000), 17; M. Johansson, ‘Les référendaires de la Cour de justice des Communautés 
européennes: hommes et femmes de l’ombre?’ Revue des Affaires Européennes 563 (2007-2008). 
28 A. Boerger-De Smedt, ‘La Cour de justice dans les négociations du traité de Paris instituant la CECA’ 14 Journal of European 
Integration History (2008) 7. 
29 A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (OUP 2006) 21. 
30 Article 167 TEEC, post-Maastricht Article 167 TEC, post-Nice Article 223 TEC. The requirements were originally derived from 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice; see Cohen, supra note 6, p. 29. 
31 The Treaty of Lisbon inserted the adjective ‘high’. Remarkable is the (continuing) omission of the phrase ‘in their respective 
countries’. 
32 M. Bobek, ‘Epilogue – Searching for the European Hercules’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A Critical Review of the 
Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (2015) 287; H. de Waele, ‘Appointment of Judges (Court of Justice of the European 
Union)’, in: H. Ruiz-Fabri (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Procedural Law (forthcoming), par. 25. 
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politicisation, but for a meaningful involvement of representative bodies in the selection and 
appointment process.33  
In close conjunction, there is the nagging lack of transparency. Up to 2010, the proceedings at the 
Council were completely shrouded in secrecy, so the people of Europe never got to know their top 
judges until they were formally anointed. Matters did not improve much with the new system, since 
the hearings of nominees by the panel take place in camera, and its reports are kept confidential. One 
rationale has been to secure the privacy of the candidates.34 Furthermore, the arrangement is thought 
to facilitate the frankness of the conversation, obviating the need for excessively diplomatic answers.35 
An earlier proposal to organise hearings at the Parliament was moreover rejected for undermining 
judicial independence.36 Similar grounds underpin the non-disclosure of the panel report, in reference 
to the legal imperative to protect personal data.37 Another objective is to avoid a chilling effect, i.e. 
discouraging potential nominees from letting their name go forward, due to risk of being rejected (and 
concomitant reputational damage). Each of these points can be rebutted though. The legal reasons 
for rigorous confidentiality appear to be flawed.38 Equally, it has been argued that “someone inclined 
to seek highest judicial office, who has a passion for the cause, should have the stomach and ability to 
stand a certain degree of public scrutiny”, adding that it may be for their own good, as it staves off 
injurious gossip in case of failure;39  that it discourages those that do not meet the necessary criteria 
anyway, and that solutions can be worked out that do no disproportionally affect the right to privacy 
(e.g. broadcasting the hearings to a restricted audience; redacting the reports before their release).40 
In the same vein, critique have been voiced on the panel’s gambit to “more clearly and precisely 
explain” the conditions listed in Articles 253 and 254 TFEU, which resulted in a longlist spanning six 
separate factors.41 Authors point to the exhaustiveness of the criteria included in the Treaty, opining 
                                                        
33 D. Kelemen, ‘Selection, Appointment, and Legitimacy – A Political Perspective’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A 
Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (2015) 258-259. 
34 ‘Final Report of the Discussion Circle on the Court of Justice at the European Convention’, Brussels, 25 March 2003, CONV 
636/03, point 6. 
35 A. Torres Pérez, ‘Can Judicial Selection Secure Judicial Independence? Constraining State Governments in Selecting 
International Judges’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European 
Courts (2015) 196. 
36 Arnull, supra note 29, at 21. 
37 The panel cites Judgment of 29 June 2010, European Commission v. The Bavarian Lager Co. Ltd, C-28/08 P, ECLI:EU:C:2010:378, 
interpreting Regulation 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents [2001] 
O.J. L 145/43 and Regulation 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data [2001] O.J. L 8/1. See ‘Activity Report of the Panel 
provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Brussels, 11 February 2011, 6509/11, COUR 
3 JUR 57, p. 3. 
38 A. Alemanno, ‘How Transparent is Transparent Enough? Balancing Access to Information Against Privacy in European Judicial 
Selections’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the European Courts (2015) 
213-214. 
39 A. von Bogdandy & C. Krenn, ‘On the Democratic Legitimacy of Europe’s Judges – A Principled and Comparative Reconstruction 
of the Selection Procedures’ in M. Bobek (ed), Selecting Europe’s Judges – A Critical Review of the Appointment Procedures to the 
European Courts (2015) 179. 
40 Torres Pérez, supra note 35, at 197-198. 
41 Namely: 1) legal expertise, demonstrating a real capacity for analysis and reflection upon the conditions and mechanisms of 
the application of EU law; 2) having acquired professional experience at the appropriate level of at least twenty years for 
appointment to the Court of Justice, and at least twelve to fifteen years for appointment to the General Court; 3) possessing the 
general ability to perform the duties of a judge; 4) the presence of solid guarantees of independence and impartiality; 5) 
 MPI Luxembourg Research Paper Series | N°2019 (4)                                                                       9 
that the panel exceeded its mandate by creating wholly new benchmarks in its elaboration.42 Adding 
insult to injuring, conspicuous by their absence are considerations related to gender. On the one hand 
this is perfectly logical, as the procedure offers no leeway to pick and choose candidates that ensure 
a balanced composition of the CJEU.43 Attaching value to the sex of the nominee evidently amounts to 
a praeter legem move. On the other hand, not doing so prolongs the sufferance of unacceptably 
backward outcomes. In 2018, a third of the US Supreme Court consists of women, with the 
appointment of Sandra Day O’Connor dating as far back as 1981. At the EU’s highest branch, the 
fraction presently stands at less than one fifth,44 with the first female Fidelma Macken being appointed 
only in 1999. If the panel indeed has no compunction to surreptitiously extend its mandate, in this 
respect it really ought to raise its game. 
The shortcomings flagged above are, admittedly, to be attributed to institutional arrangements: the 
Union’s judiciary itself can hardly be held accountable for the dealings of the system’s architects. There 
is no hard proof either of gross negligence or underperformance among judges. Also, it must be noted 
that there exists no uniformity or consensus in national, international or supranational circles with 
regard to the optimal method for selection and appointment: countless variations may be observed, 
grand as well as subtle – ranging from entirely open recruitment strategies to less manifest ‘direct 
tapping’, and from intense review procedures to marginal suitability assessments.45 Although the 2010 
revisions heralded a change for the better, we are nonetheless able to identify several weaknesses of 
the EU approach which are bound to affect the legitimacy of the Court, and are yet to be addressed. 
 
 
IV. (Too) Far From Heaven: The Quality of the Court’s Output 
 
Litres of ink have been spilled on the style and structure of the judgments delivered since 1954.46 In 
the beginning, the French influence loomed large, with the texts ordered in a tight corset. The 
reasoning was summary, each paragraph taking off from a typical ‘attendu que’ flourish. The factual 
background, sufficiently sketched in the report for the hearing, received little attention. Pundits trying 
                                                        
knowledge of languages; 6) aptitude for working as part of a team in an international environment in which several legal systems 
are represented. In 2017, a seventh criterion was introduced, focusing on the physical capacity of candidates to carry out duties 
which (given their highly demanding nature) require good health. See ‘Activity Report of the Panel provided for in Article 255 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Brussels, 28 February 2018, 22. 
42 See e.g. von Bogdandy & Krenn, supra note 39, at 173-174. 
43 Theoretically the Treaty text does offer room for individual Member States to present a shortlist, instead of just one name. 
44 5 out of 28 judges (excluding AG); state of play at 1 May 2018. 
45 See e.g. R. Mackenzie, K. Malleson, P. Martin & Ph. Sands, Selecting International Judges. Principle, Process, and Politics (2010). 
46 See e.g. A.E. Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law (1978); C. Gulmann, ‘Methods of Interpretation of the 
European Court of Justice’ 24 Scandinavian Studies in Law (1980) 187; M. Dederichs, Die Methodik des EuGH: Häufigkeit und 
Bedeutung methodischer Argumente in den Begründungen des Gerichtshofes der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (2004); E. Paunio & S. 
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, ‘Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law’ 16 
European Law Journal (2010) 395; G. Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (2012); G. Beck, The 
Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (2013); S. Sankari, European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context (2013). 
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to divine the meaning of cryptic passages could bicker endlessly about the importance of particular 
terms and phrases. 
From the 1980s onwards the format underwent a noticeable evolution, becoming more accessible, 
growing in length, providing for an almost pleasant read by the turn of the century. Behind this façade, 
alas, the grand strategy was maintained of announcing the decision, instead of engaging in a 
thoughtful discussion. A formulaic method is employed, whereby sentences or sections are 
conveniently copy-pasted from previous pronouncements.47 Deduction is favoured, induction rare. In 
so doing, the Court occasionally resorts to the fallacy known as petitio principii: that what needs to be 
demonstrated is presented as a normative necessity. Of late, this brought one esteemed author to 
lambast a string of cases that boiled down to “a circumloquacious statement of the result, rather than 
a reason for arriving at it”.48  
Again, to avoid misunderstandings, the quality of the output does not stand accused of falling short 
across the board. At the same time, a plethora of judgments can be named from different decades 
that is marred by grave inadequacies. Thereby, the lack of persuasiveness of the conclusions reached 
seems intimately related to the poor articulation and presentation of the underlying motives. Classics 
such as Van Gend & Loos, Plaumann, Chernobyl and Francovich are fair game.49 Without much effort, 
one shoots similarly large holes in recent rulings such as Mangold, Test-Achats, Ruiz Zambrano, Sturgeon 
and Pringle.50 Commentators have taken issue with inter alia the overkill of categorical statements, 
inconsistencies with vested dicta, the lack of balance in interpretation techniques, a harrowing 
succinctness, contra legem proclivities, or excessive reliance on cluster citations.51 At the origin of these 
failings lies predominantly the need for a single, collegiate judgment. Contrary to the situation at the 
European Court of Human Rights, the International Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court, 
                                                        
47 See Bobek, supra note 2, p. 170; L. Azoulai, ‘La fabrication de la jurisprudence communautaire’ in P. Mbongo & A. Vauchez (eds.), 
Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes (2009), 163; M. 
Jacob, Precedent and Case-Based Reasoning in the European Court of Justice: Unfinished Business (2014). 
48 S. Weatherill, ‘The Court's Case Law on the Internal Market: “a Circumloquacious Statement of the Result, Rather than a Reason 
for Arriving at it”?’ in M. Adams, H. de Waele, J. Meeusen & G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges – The Legitimacy of the 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice (2013), 87. 
49 Judgment of 5 February 1963, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie 
der belastingen, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v. Commission, C-25/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:17; 
Judgment of 22 May 1990, Parliament v Council, C-70/88, (Chernobyl); Judgment of 19 November 1991, Andrea Francovich v Italy, 
Joined cases C-6 & 9/90, ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.  
50 Judgment of 22 November 2005, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, C-144/04, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709; Judgment of 1 March 2011, 
Association Belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL and Others v. Conseil des ministres, C-236/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100; 
Judgment of 8 March 2011, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v. Office national de l’emploi, C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124; Judgment of 19 
November 2009, Christopher Sturgeon, Gabriel Sturgeon and Alana Sturgeon v Condor Flugdienst GmbH and Stefan Böck en Cornelia 
Lepuschitz v. Air France SA, Joined cases C-402 and C-432/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:716; Judgment of 27 November 2012, Thomas 
Pringle v. Governement of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General, C-370/12, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756. 
51 See e.g. N. Nic Shuibne, ‘Seven Questions for Seven Paragraphs’ 36 European Law Review (2011)  161; K. Hailbronner & D. 
Thym, ‘Case Note Ruiz Zambrano’ 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) 1253; A. Dashwood, ‘From Van Duyn to Mangold via 
Marshall: Reducing Direct Effect to Absurdity?’ Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2006-2007, 81-109; J. H. H. Weiler, 
‘Epilogue: Judging the Judges – Apology and Critique’ in M. Adams, H. de Waele, J. Meeusen & G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging 
Europe’s Judges – The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (2013), 243; ‘Editorial Comments – Reflections on 
the State of the Union 50 Years after Van Gend en Loos’ 50 Common Market Law Review (2013), 354; T. Horsley, ‘Reflections on 
the Role of the Court of Justice as the “Motor” of European Integration: Legal Limits to Judicial Lawmaking’ 50 Common Market 
Law Review (2013) 931; S. Weatherill, ‘The “Principles of Civil Law” as a Basis for Interpreting the Legislative Acquis’ 6 European 
Review of Contract Law (2010) 74. 
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dissenting opinions are not permitted.52 Hence, to have its way, a majority regularly sees itself forced 
to delete essential elements from the ratio decidendi.53 In the worst case, this leads to a non-sequitur 
that takes away the credibility of the whole verdict. Unfortunately, the judgments of a Grand Chamber 
comprised of fifteen judges, which are supposed to carry the greatest weight of all, are most prone to 
display such a defect. Just as hated are the repeated instances of ‘implied reversal’, where the Court 
backtracks on a previous position without deigning to own up to it.54 The increasing discrepancies 
between the verdicts of different chambers do not exactly encourage its popularity either.55 The judges 
are warned that if they do not adhere to a minimum of consistency, their importance shall diminish 
quickly.56 An open admission of a volte-face is in any case preferable to a shallow concealment. 
Having said this, the point should not be overstated. The CJEU is entrusted with a singularly difficult 
task. In mandating it to “ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed”, Article 19 TEU barely conveys the true scale and complexity. In view of the growing diversity 
of its readership, spread out across a Union of two dozen countries with their own distinct cultural 
tastes and professional traditions, the CJEU’s style is ever less capable (nor likely) to appeal to everyone. 
Whereas the slipups ought not be swept under the carpet, the qualitative and quantitative advances 
deserve mentioning too – such as the doubling in size of the response provided to national courts 
under the preliminary reference procedure, in roughly twenty years.57  
The higher a court ranks however, the higher the demands that one may place on them: output of the 
supreme court of the EU ought therefore to be supremely clear and compelling. In the near future, 
the progress achieved in run-of-the-mill cases needs to be made also in landmark rulings – a precious 
genre, which so far keeps lagging behind in multiple ways.58 At those crucial junctures in the 
development of the law, the magistrates of the Kirchberg cannot afford to fall back on laconic, terse, 
                                                        
52 But contrast J.L. Dunoff & M.A. Pollack, ‘The Judicial Trilemma’ 111 American Journal of International Law (2017) 245, expounding 
that “[w]hile this is surely a plausible reading of the Statute, the relevant language hardly compels this conclusion”.   
53 See e.g. U. Everling, ‘The Court as a Decision-Making Authority’ 82 Michigan Law Review (1984) 1308; D. Edward, ‘How the Court 
of Justice Works’ 20 European Law Review  (1995) 556; K. Lenaerts, ‘The Court’s Outer and Inner Selves: Exploring the External 
and Internal Legitimacy of the European Court of Justice’ in M. Adams, H. de Waele, J. Meeusen & G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging 
Europe’s Judges – The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (2013), 46. 
54 Compare the many examples cited by P. Wattel, ‘Köbler, CILFIT and Welthgrove: We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This’ 41 Common 
Market Law Review (2004) 179; see also A. Ondoua, ‘L'influence de la Cour dans l’élaboration des traités européens’ in P. Mbongo 
& A. Vauchez (eds.), Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes 
(2009), 199. 
55 See e.g. N. Nic Shuibne, ‘A Court within a Court: Is it Time to Rebuild the Court of Justice?’ 34 European Law Review (2009) 174. 
56 T. Koopmans, ‘Stare Decisis in European Law’ in D. O’Keeffe & H. G. Schermers (eds.), Essays in European Law and Integration 
(1982), 27; see also M. Poiares Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ 1 
European Journal of Legal Studies (2007) 14: “In other words, it is not enough for a court to be consistent in how [it] interprets a 
particular legal rule. It is necessary for that court to be consistent in its interpretation of that rule in the light of its interpretation 
of the entire legal system.” See also S. Besson, ‘From European Integration to European integrity – Should European Law Speak 
with Just One Voice?’ 10 European Law Journal (2004) 281. 
57 M. Bobek, ‘Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: The Legitimacy of the Court of Justice through the Eyes of National Courts’ in M. 
Adams, H. de Waele, J. Meeusen & G. Straetmans (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges – The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European 
Court of Justice (2013), 204. 
58 Cf M. Lasser, ‘Anticipating Three Models of Judicial Control, Debate and Legitimacy: The European Court of Justice, the Cour 
de cassation and the United States Supreme Court’ Jean Monnet Working Paper 1/03 (2013), 49: “In fact, despite their 
abandonment of the single-sentence syllogism, ECJ decisions continue to be unsigned, univocal, magisterial and largely 
deductive documents that reveal decidedly less than they might.” 
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or sibylline snippets.59 Of course, no judiciary on earth succeeds in delivering perfection. Even so, 
those invested with the “awesome power” to do justice are obliged to ensure that their decisions are 
as good as they can possibly get.60 
 
 
V. On the Brink of Fratricide? Pressures and Agitations From Within 
 
In the initial plans for the European Coal and Steel Community, no room was foreseen for a Court of 
Justice: the Council of Ministers was perceived as the antipode of, and main safeguard against the 
executive, the High Authority.61 The establishment of an independent judicial body appeared on the 
agenda in late 1950, on the instigation of the German representatives involved in the negotiations on 
the draft of the ECSC Treaty.62 The idea was adopted, allegedly with some hesitation, and put in 
practice in 1952. In 1958, the ECSC Court was transformed into the institution serving the three 
Communities.  
After a relatively long honeymoon, the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction went hand in hand with 
the growth of its workload. Nevertheless, upon reaching maturity in the 1970s, it could wallow in the 
pleasure of its unique and exclusive competences – functioning at the highest imaginable level within 
the EC, with national courts seriously taking notice of their ability (and in specific circumstances, 
obligation) to approach it for a binding opinion on a case brought before them. Shortly thereafter, the 
Commission started to energetically pursue its task of prosecuting Member States for violations of EC 
law whereby the Court enjoyed the final say. 
The judges gradually became aware that that this setup had a price. Soon, the Luxembourg docket 
exploded with preliminary references and so-called direct actions. By the mid-1980s, pressures 
reached a peak point. The hundreds of log-jammed cases, rendering a sufficiently swift adjudication 
impossible, stirred up momentum for an innovative remedy: the creation of a novel limb, the Court of 
First Instance (CFI), inaugurated in 1989. Though the principal aim was to effectively relieve the 
workload of its ‘big brother’, the founders consciously endowed it with only a limited jurisdiction.63 To 
avoid poaching on each other’s preserve, no parallel litigation was allowed for, and a right of appeal 
was installed of CFI judgments to the ECJ. Thus, it seemed probable that the occasions where the two 
could get in each other’s hair would be few and far between. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the Court of First Instance took on 
the new name ‘General Court of the European Union’, but despite that broader designation, no 
meaningful devolution of responsibilities was enacted. Already the Treaty of Nice that entered into 
force in 2003 enabled the CFI to decide preliminary references in a couple of fields, yet the Statute of 
                                                        
59 Cf. T. Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism” 21 European Law Review (1996) 210. 
60 F. Frankfurter, dissenting in Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). 
61 P. Reuter, La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l’acier (1953), 53; M. Lagrange, ‘La Cour de justice des communautés 
européennes: du Plan Schuman à l'union européenne' Revue trimestrielle de droit européen (1978) 2. 
62 J.-V. Louis, ‘Organisations européennes’ 30 Revue international de droit comparé (1978) 363. 
63 By the same token, a seven-member Civil Service Tribunal was established in 2005 (liquidated in 2016). 
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the CJEU was never amended to define the latter precisely. A salient detail is that, in accordance with 
Article 281 TFEU, such an amendment requires the President of the institution to play along.64 From 
his part, the willingness to concede has, up until now, ostensibly been minimal. On the one hand, this 
is without question linked to the fact that in the mid-2000s, the General Court experienced difficulties 
in coping with the rising tide of direct actions. On the other hand, the reticence presumably had 
something to do with the internal hierarchy, and the perception thereof at the superior branch. At 
some moments, these sentiments are known to have flared up and run high. During the 12-year reign 
of the previous President, when preparations were made to overhaul the CJEU’s architecture, the 
mutual relations acquired a downright frosty character.65 Open clashes rarely occur, but various 
documents have transpired that testify of acrimonious disputes behind the scenes.66  
The gravity and frequency of the incidents must not be exaggerated, but the recurring pattern bears 
a strong resemblance to that of an older child chastising the younger. Seemingly, the rift runs deeper 
than the casual frustration of the General Court having to shoulder the greater burdens and dispose 
of the more mundane cases, whilst the Court of Justice sits squarely in the limelight, deciding the 
spectacularly prestigious ones. A GC member will not be massively disappointed by a quashing of 
his/her judgment either.67 The quarrels do suggest a toxic mix of professional and personal agitations: 
an innate but ill-received penchant for domination, coupled with an engrained incompatibilité d’humeur 
between several protagonists.68 
In sum, it is a public secret that hitherto, the siblings have not been getting along as well as one would 
wish. To some extent, the fractious status quo emanates from the natural rivalry between judicial 
institutions, alluded to above; Cain-and-Abel syndrome sounds like an apt diagnosis. Considering the 
indicators for good governance outlined by the European Commission in 2001, in particular openness, 
effectiveness and coherence, the conduct falls woefully short of the mark.69 The same goes for the 
standards provided by the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, in particular the values of integrity, 
diligence and propriety.70 The silver lining consists in the palpably improving communications since 
the CJEU’s new President, elected in 2015, took office. Undoubtedly, the increasing presence of judges 
at the Court of Justice that served before at the General Court helps. There are other hopeful signs of 
a thawing on the outside and the inside.71 The next stage in the life of this important institution 
                                                        
64 Both the Commission and the Court can take the initiative; in the second situation the Council is obliged to consult the latter. 
65 See e.g. D. Robinson, ‘The First Rule of ECJ Fight Club … Is About To Be Broken’, Financial Times (London, 27 June 2015); S. 
Peers, ‘“Don’t Mention the Extra Judges!” When CJEU Reform Turns Into Farce’ (3 July 2015) <www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com> 
(last visited 31 May 2018).; A. Alemanno & L. Pech, ‘Where Do We Stand on the Reform of the EU’s Court System? On a Reform 
as Short-sighted as the Attempts to Force through its Adoption’ (23 September 2015) <www.verfassungsblog.de> (last visited 
31 May 2018). 
66 For a pretty damning mémoire, see also ‘EU Judge Dehousse’s Farewell Address to the CJEU’ (27 October 2016) 
<www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com> (last visited 31 May 2018). 
67 But compare the ECJ’s damning of the GC’s competition law assessments, huffishly discussed by M. Jaeger, ‘The Standard of 
Review in Competition Cases involving Complex Economic Assessment: Towards the Marginalisation of Marginal Review’, 2 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice (2011) 303.  
68 See the sources mentioned supra, note 65, and the documents referred to therein. 
69 ‘European Governance – A White Paper’ COM (2001) 428. 
70 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2003/43; UN Economic and Social Council, Resolution 2006/23, Annex 1. 
71 See the relatively upbeat conclusion of Judge Dehousse’s valedictory speech, cited supra note 66. 
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therefore looks bright. If relapses are averted, the strenuous phase may rapidly fade from memory, 
and the scant evidence wind up as a collection of minor items in the archives. 
 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The often recounted story of the Court of Justice of the European Union is that of an actor going from 
strength to strength. The late Federico Mancini for instance regaled listeners with the amazing tale of 
how it had single-handedly framed a constitution for a quasi-federal polity, swaying colleagues at the 
domestic level to accept its decisions over copious champagne-sprinkled lunches.72 At heart, such 
enthusiasts and eulogists are anything but wrong. We are not dealing with the proverbial glass that is 
half empty or half full, depending on one’s bias: the powers, privileges and recognition granted to the 
institution located today at the Boulevard Konrad Adenauer speak for themselves. From its cautious 
inception at the Villa Vauban, the Court deftly navigated its way through the tumultuous 1960s-1970s 
crisis era. Bit by bit, the judiciary managed to cement its position, instil a habit of obedience, and realise 
the emancipation of the European legal order. Consequently, in the eyes of many, it borders on the 
absurd to even attempt to draw up a ‘taxonomy of failings’. 
The foregoing attempted such an exposé notwithstanding, stressing the inevitable paucity of the 
findings. The common denominator of the flaws that have been identified is their covertness. We can 
easily be overawed by the rate of compliance with the CJEU’s dicta, but that hides from view the 
unresolved tensions between the national and the supranational courts. Incidental eruptions such as 
the cheeky posturing of the Czech Constitutional Court and the Danish Supreme Court underscore 
the looming risk of escalation. Prima facie, the newly revamped selection and appointment procedure 
inspires confidence, but it simultaneously raises the question why this was necessary in the first place, 
and with which frequency suboptimal past nominees (undeservedly) slipped through the net. The 
2010 reform did not eradicate these and other concerns, albeit that a big share of the blame must be 
placed on the Herren der Verträge. Conversely, there should be enough (internal) opportunities to 
consider and implement qualitative improvements to the Court’s output, marred by a variable gamut 
of deficiencies. While visible advances have been made, the situation still does not seem to be entirely 
under control. This is worrisome, for the decisions of a supreme court ought to be supremely clear 
and compelling, in order to retain a sufficient measure of legitimacy. Likewise, while it is disingenuous 
to overestimate the friction between the ‘senior branch’ and the ‘junior branch’ of the CJEU, the 
protagonists did not always succeed in keeping the conflicts under wraps. One could qualify the 
struggle as a rite de passage, but they leave an indelible stain on the record nonetheless – and the 
underlying inferiority/superiority complex that informed the feuds is unlikely to dissipate automatically. 
In this context, it would be foolhardy and absolutely inappropriate to apply the label ‘debacle’ in the 
traditional sense of the term. The current paper merely endeavoured to flag up some problematic 
                                                        
72 See K. J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law (2001) ix. 
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elements that are frequently overlooked, worthy of note, and yet to be overcome; it constitutes no 
wholesale critique. All sincere chroniqueurs will acknowledge that both honours and blemishes belong 
in the annals of the integration project. Observers aiming for amelioration that dare to put a finger on 
the sore spots are, however, rarely greeted with applause.73 Consolation is to be found in the old 
Roman creed that “initium est salutis notitia peccati”.74  
                                                        
73 Cf. supra, note 5. 
74 “The awareness of an impropriety enables the healing process to begin” – Seneca, Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium, no 28 (author’s 
free translation). 
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